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Abstract 
 
 Our research provides new econometric evidence concerning partial economic risk 
sharing between a frail elderly parent and an adult child.  We estimate a jointly determined 
limited dependent variables system explaining the parent’s entry into a nursing home, the adult 
child’s visits to the parent, and the adult child’s labor supplied.  The time allocation of adult sons 
is unaffected by a parent’s frail health.  Adult daughters who visit a frail elderly parent daily 
decrease their annual labor supplied by about 1,000 hours annually, largely through labor force 
non-participation.  The implied welfare loss to the daughter from a frail elderly parent in need of 
frequent visits is about $180,000.  Our results run counter to the moral hazard argument against 
long-term care insurance and clarify the two sides’ positions in the policy debate over the degree 
of generosity of recently proposed tax credits for adult children who help care for sick aged 
parents. 
 
  
“One mother can take care of several children, but several children 
do not take care of one mother.” 
Seelig Freund, M.D. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Economists and policymakers have a common goal of clarifying intergenerational 
economic linkages.  Micro level motivations include better understanding of family economic 
decision making, the welfare implications of implicit insurance provided by families, developing 
economies prior to formal social insurance, and women’s labor supply.  Macroeconomic 
motivators include a possible need to have intergenerational concerns in models of the economy 
through overlapping generations and fiscal policy effectiveness issues related to the Lucas 
critique.  The most influential empirical literature on interfamily economic connections focuses 
on consumption smoothing (Deaton 1997; Gertler and Gruber 1997; and Laitner 1997).  Despite 
recent elegant econometric models intended to detect risk pooling within and between families 
there are few empirically well-supported examples of economically significant informal risk-
sharing arrangements among families in the United States (Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 1992; 
Hayashi, Altonji, and Kotlikoff 1996; Hess and Shin 2000).  United States data generally reject 
complete inter-family risk sharing.  Of course, the absence of full insurance does not necessarily 
mean that there is no risk sharing at between households.  Here we provide new econometric 
evidence of the labor market and welfare consequences of partial economic risk sharing between 
elderly parents and their adult children. 
 A fundamental difficulty in empirical research on intergenerational familial links is that 
theory has outrun data.  Economists have little data on actual interfamily transfers of time and 
money so that the mode research compares a full insurance framework, which implies a zero  
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covariation between consumption and current income, to a more general situation where 
consumption covaries with current income.  Economic data are generally not rich enough to 
disentangle complex underlying motives such as altruism versus strategic bequests among 
parents and children (McGarry 2000).  Our more basic approach is to examine what a researcher 
can minimally infer from available micro information about intergenerational economic 
relationships. 
 In light of economists’ inability to locate full risk sharing with complex models of 
consumption we take a step back and develop a simple conceptual framework for studying 
intergenerational risk sharing of an easily identifiable clearly exogenous costly event—a serious 
decline in an aged parent’s health that may require a long-term stay in a nursing home.  We treat 
as jointly determined the parent’s nursing home entry, how much the adult son or daughter visits 
the parent in poor health, and the adult child’s labor supply.  In our theoretical model nursing 
home entry can have an income effect on the adult child’s labor supply and earnings.  The son or 
daughter may work more hours to enable sharing the financial burden of a nursing home.  The 
child may also visit an aged parent in a nursing home more often than in another residential 
setting, which affects the adult child’s labor supply by reducing time available for labor market 
activity.  Our model allows for joint endogeneity of a parent’s nursing home entry, how much an 
adult child visits his or her parents, and how much the adult child works for pay.  When 
estimated our model reveals patterns of intergenerational economic linkages of general interest to 
economists and of specific interest to policy makers wrestling with issues of female labor supply 
and long term care for the elderly population in the United States. 
 Our data come from a unique supplement to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 
on frail elderly parents of panel members.  Because adult daughters may behave differently from 
adult sons in sharing risk with elderly parents we stratify our econometric estimates by sex of the 
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adult child.  The focus of our research is on identifying the effect of the parent’s long-term 
nursing home stay on the time allocation of adult sons versus adult daughters. 
 We find the following results of note for adult children with frail elderly parents.  Sons 
labor supply is unaffected by the consequences of a parent in poor health.  In contrast, daughters 
via reduced labor force participation reduce their labor supplied by an average of 1,000 hours 
annually with frequent visits to a frail elderly parent.  In current dollars the implied welfare loss 
that a daughter experiences from an elderly parent in bad health is substantial, about $180,000. 
Our results have implications for the moral hazard argument against long-term care insurance 
and clarify the positions of the two sides in the debate over recently proposed tax credits for 
adult children who care for sick aged parents. 
 
2. Theoretical Background 
 
 At the center of our conceptual model is the labor supply of the adult child because it is 
where there is the least research on the intergenerational consequences of poor parental health.  It 
is also the place in our model where the data reveal the welfare cost of a frail elderly parent to 
the adult son or daughter.  A related literature examines the cost of children (Blundell, Preston, 
and Walker 1994; Deaton 1997).  A conceptual problem with the cost of children literature is 
that it takes a likely choice variable, an additional child, and assumes it is a bad from the parents’ 
perspective.  Here we study a clearly exogenous welfare-reducing event that is a serious decline 
in the health of ones parent. 
 We begin with the maintained hypothesis that the adult child cares sufficiently about the 
parent’s well-being so that the child has essentially a pre-commitment to share the extra time and 
money costs of a parent whose health declines.  The son or daughter is assumed to display 
gratitude for the parent’s nurturing when young and feels obligated to repay the parent whose 
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health is declining at the end of life.  We view the underlying gratitude motive as a basic 
assumption that in turn produces testable behavioral implications of interest to economists and 
policymakers. 
Applying the Canonical Labor Supply Model 
 For clarity and a desire for a model acknowledging the boundaries of our data we frame 
our discussion using the simplest applicable economic theory.  The canonical model of labor 
supply (h) is summarized algebraically by 
 ( , , | )h h T w y= α , (1) 
where T is total allocable time, w is the wage, y is nonwage income, and α is the vector of utility 
function parameters that give form to labor supply.  Ex ante, one expects 0Th >  and 0yh < .  
 An adult child’s desire to aid a parent in poor health means that an exogenous illness 
affects the child’s labor supply through two components of full income, wT y+ .  Visits to help 
care for and comfort a parent lower allocable time, T, which reduces the child’s h.  The child 
may also help with uninsured medical expenses, which creates an exogenous reduction in y that 
lowers the child’s own consumption and raises the amount the adult child will want to work to 
offset the lost income.  If v is time spent visiting the parent, then dv dT= − , and if n is 
expenditures on the parent’s health care, then dn dy= − .  The two effects of the help that the son 
or daughter gives the parent are jointly offsetting on the adult child’s labor supply as described 
by the total differential 
 ( ) ( )T y v ndh h dT h dy h d v h dn= − + − = + . (2) 
Our econometric model is designed to separate the negative partial effect of visits to an 
unexpectedly sick parent on labor supply (hv) from the positive partial effect of monetary 
transfers to a sick parent on labor supply that are economically equivalent to a reduction in the 
son’s or daughter’s nonlabor income (hn).1 
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Intergenerational Welfare Implications of A Parental Health Decline 
 Estimates of the labor supply income effect, hy, can be used with estimates of the labor 
supply parental nursing home entry effect, hn, to infer the welfare effect on the adult child from 
having a parent in such bad health that a nursing home entry occurs.  Deaton (1997) argues that 
Rothbarth’s method strikes the optimal balance between theoretical foundation and empirical 
tractability in calculating welfare loss. 
 Ceteris paribus, the welfare effects of nursing home entry can be seen by considering the 
differential equation 
 0=+= dyhdnhdh yn . (3) 
The implied lump-sum payment that would exactly compensate the adult child for the economic 
burden of a parent in a nursing home is then 
 yn hhdndy // −= . (4) 
Similarly, the implied lump-sum payment that would exactly compensate the adult child for the 
time burden of a parent in a nursing home is 
 / /v ydy dv h h= − . (5) 
Estimating the child’s welfare loss through the parameters of labor supply using the Rothbarth 
method described in (4) and (5) is depicted in Figure 1. 
 We now develop the econometric model that stochastically represents the canonical labor 
supply model extended to include intergenerational economic linkages as described by equations 
(1) through (5).  Evidence consistent with intergenerational risk sharing here would include an 
effect of a parent’s bad health on either the adult child’s labor supply or visits to the parent. 
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3. Econometric Framework 
 
 As noted, we want to estimate the effect of informal caregiving (visits by children to 
elderly parents) and parents’ living arrangements (nursing home versus living independently) on 
the labor supply of adult sons versus daughters.  A labor supply regression including time spent 
visiting a parent as a regressor that is estimated in isolation may produce biased coefficients 
because adult children who care greatly about their parents’ well-being (an unobserved attribute) 
may also be inclined to work relatively fewer hours and visit a parent more to provide relatively 
more hours of informal care.  Because all can be affected by stochastic unobserved and 
potentially correlated factors we permit both visits to the parent and the parent’s nursing home 
entry to be econometrically endogenous with respect to the labor supply of adult children. 
 In addition to being simultaneous, the outcome variables of interest are not continuous. 
Labor supply is left-censored at zero and visits to a parent and nursing home entry by a parent 
are observed as indicator variables in our data.  We now discuss how we specify the joint latent 
distribution of each outcome variable underlying a simultaneous three equation limited 
dependent variables system. 
Two-Stage Semiparametric Instrumental Variables Estimation 
 The model that produces our estimates corresponding to equations (1) through (5) is: 
 *1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1i i i i iY Y Y x′= γ + γ + β + ε , (6) 
where i indexes individuals (i = 1 to N), and Y1 is the observed annual hours worked by the adult 
son or daughter during the year of parental frailty. Labor supply is censored according to the rule 
 *1
*
11 )0(1 iii YYY >= , (7) 
where 1(.) is the indicator function, which equals unity if the inequality in the parentheses is 
true and zero otherwise. Y2 and Y3 are dummy endogenous variables representing whether the 
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adult child visited the frail elderly parent daily and whether the elderly parent entered a nursing 
home coincident with frailty. 
 To avoid sensitivity to parametric assumptions, such as joint normality of the 
disturbance term 1ε  and the disturbance terms implicit in the equations for Y2 and Y3, we 
specify a two-stage semiparametric instrumental variables framework (Newey 1985).2  Any 
consistent estimator could in principle be used to generate the first stage predicted values for 
the binary endogenous variables.  We use semiparametric regression models based on the 
maximum score estimator (Manski 1975, 1985).  In the first stage we estimate 
 
1
max sgn( ) /
n
ji ji j
i
Y Z n
δ
=
δ∑ , (8) 
where j = 2, 3, representing the two endogenous dummy variables, sgn(.) represents the sign 
function, which is 1 if the term in parentheses is positive and –1 otherwise, Z is a vector of 
covariates, and δ  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated.  The MSCORE estimators has 
the advantages of  avoiding a possibly false error distribution assumption and maximizing 
the number of correct predictions by design and has the disadvantage of undefined marginal 
effects for the regressors, which is not a problem for us because we only use our MSCORE 
results to instrument potentially endogenous regressors in the labor supply function. 
 Using the estimated reduced form coefficients from (8), we generate predicted values 
of the binary indicators that are substituted into (6) yielding 
 *1 1 2 2 3 1 1 1ˆ ˆi i i i iY Y Y x′= γ + γ + β +ε . (9) 
Instead of following Newey’s (1985) suggestion of using Powell’s (1986) symmetrically 
trimmed least squares estimator, which depends on the assumption of a symmetric 
distribution.  To estimate equation (9) we opt for the censored least absolute deviation 
(CLAD) estimator (Powell 1984).3  The CLAD model minimizes the average absolute 
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deviation between *1iY  and 1 2 2 3 1 1ˆ ˆmax(0, )i i iY Y x′γ + γ + β , and makes no assumptions about 
normality or homoskedasticity.  The CLAD model is consistent and asymptotically normal 
under mild regularity conditions.   
Additional Econometric Model Specification Issues 
 Identification of the model requires that Z2i and Z3i contain at least one exogenous 
variable not present in x1i.  We estimate the model separately for sons and daughters because 
there may be different labor supply and care giving responses to parental frailty by gender (Stone 
and Short 1990; Mui 1995).  To test the robustness of our semiparametric IV model, we also 
estimate it by two-stage least squares (2SLS).  Although not completely appropriate for the 
limited dependent variables in our model, its lack of strong distributional assumptions makes 
2SLS a useful comparison to our focal IV-CLAD model (Angrist 2001).  As another check on 
how much of a difference avoiding a parametric assumption makes we also present complete 
results from a three-equation structural model of labor supply, informal care giving, and nursing 
home entry.  The structural comparison model assumes joint-normality of the disturbance terms, 
and we estimate it using full-information maximum likelihood (FIML).  
 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
 The mode data set used to study annual household economic behavior is The Panel Study 
of Income Dynamics (Hill 1992). Occasionally the PSID includes surveys on special topics, such 
as the 1991 Parent Health Supplement (PHS), which we use with the main PSID family data files 
for 1979–1991 to determine the effect of care giving and elderly living arrangements on the labor 
supply of adult sons and daughters. 
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Using the Parental Health Supplement 
 The 1991 Parental Health Supplement asked for parental health information from regular 
PSID respondents who had at least one parent over the age of 70 or who had a parent over 70 
that had died after 1980.  The PHS contains detailed information on the elderly parent’s health 
status, wealth, living arrangements, long-term care and informal health care use.  The survey did 
not question the elderly directly; their adult sons and daughters were proxy respondents. 
Surveying the adult children has some advantages because the frail elderly parents can be unable 
to withstand a lengthy survey, and the adult children can be able to report the details of their 
parents’ circumstances accurately.  Even though some of the events of interest happened ten 
years before the survey date, because the questions are about a memorable event, the frailty or 
death of a parent, the quality of the PHS data should be relatively good. 
 We matched PHS records to the PSID Family Waves for the adult children in two years, 
the year when the parent became frail and the year before the parent became frail, which yielded 
a sample of 556 elderly parent-child pairs spanning 1979–1991.  Frailty in the PHS is the 
condition when a person can no longer live independently and take care of daily needs without 
assistance.  The adult sons and daughters in the PSID decided if and when their parents met the 
frailty criterion, in which case they answered questions concerning their frail elderly parents. 
 In addition to living arrangements the adult children reported the frequency of contact 
with their parents around the time of frailty.  Frequency is reported as daily, weekly, monthly, 
yearly, less frequently than once a year, or no contact. 
 Because of our interest in examining the effect of a parent’s frailty on the adult child’s 
labor supply, we restrict our sample to prime-age sons and daughters (no older than 60 by 1991), 
which avoids having to model the adult child’s decision to retire from the labor force.  Although 
the PSID is the mode data set for United States longitudinal labor supply studies the elderly 
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parent characteristics supplement covers only the year of the frailty episode.  Because we could 
retrieve the work hours of the adult children in the year prior to the frailty we can get a flavor of 
the dynamics of the sons’ and daughters’ responses to parental frailty.  Overall, our combined 
PHS-PSID data set includes the details of 556 frailty incidents along with labor supply 
information of one adult child in the year the parent became frail and in the year before the 
parent became frail during 1979–1991. 
 On the down side, the PHS did not survey respondents whose parents did not become 
frail, which eliminates a natural control group and makes a researcher compare the 
intergenerational consequences of varying degrees of parental frailty.  The survey also did not 
ask the extent of any monetary assistance the sons and daughters provided their parents.  The 
number of frail elderly parents limits the size of the PHS, which makes the number of co-resident 
adult child-elderly parent pairs too few to study in isolation.  Although identifying the factors 
associated with shared living arrangements is a potentially important topic, only about 6 percent 
of adult children were co-residents, so we dropped them from our data set.  Finally, a more 
complete picture of inter-generational care giving would be possible if the PHS had sampled all 
the adult children of an elderly person.  In spite of the acknowledged defects the Parental Health 
Supplement to the Panel Study of Income Dynamics is a useful collection of information about 
the health and living arrangements of the frail elderly in the United States. 
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the three endogenous variables.  About 93 
percent of the sons and 70 percent of the daughters worked during the year of a parent’s frailty; 
the proportions were similar during the year before the frailty.  Of persons who worked, sons 
worked slightly over 2,100 hours annually, and daughters worked roughly 1,600 hours annually, 
both in the year of frailty and the year before the frailty.  The adult children had a relatively high 
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degree of contact with their parents; 72 percent of daughters and 75 percent of sons visited their 
parents at least once a month and 28 percent of daughters and 23 percent of sons visited their 
parents daily.  About 30 percent of frail elderly parents entered a nursing home at the time of 
their frailty. 
 Descriptive statistics for the elderly parents’ exogenous characteristics stratified by the 
adult child’s gender appear in Table 2.  The descriptive statistics for the frail elderly parents 
include health status variables at the time of frailty: impairments to activities of daily living 
(ADL), impairments to instrumental activities of daily living (IDL), whether the person was 
hospitalized coincident with frailty, number of chronic conditions, and the specific chronic 
conditions of a broken hip, osteoporosis, stroke, and incontinence.4  Parents’ demographic 
variables also appearing in Table 2 include gender, education, age, race, number of sons and 
daughters, net worth, and whether the frail elder owned a home.  Home ownership and net worth 
are for the time just prior to the onset of frailty.  The average age at frailty was 78 years old. 
There are slightly more frail elderly women than frail elderly men in our data, and 75 percent of 
the frail elders are white.  The typical frail elder in our data had four limitations to both ADLs 
and IADLs plus four chronic conditions.  Over one-half the frail elderly in our data had a 
hospital stay accompanying the onset of frailty.  Nearly one-half the frail elderly had a spouse 
present.  To summarize their economic situation, nearly two-thirds of the frail elderly in our data 
owned a home at the time of frailty; the elders’ average net worth was about $80,000 and their 
median net worth was about $50,000. 
 The exogenous variables for the adult children are shown in Table 3, stratified by gender. 
Included are age, education, marital status, lagged non-wage income, number of children in 
various age categories, and years of full-time work experience.  The adult sons in our data had 
roughly twice the full-time work experience of the adult daughters and slightly higher levels of 
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education.  The sons and daughters were in their mid-forties at the time their parents became frail 
and lived in families with roughly $10,000 of annual income that was not their own labor market 
earnings.  Because the typical sons and daughters are in their mid-forties when their parents 
became frail, only about 8 percent had young children in the year a parent became frail.  Finally, 
the mode distance to the parent’s residence was less than ten miles.5 
 
5. Empirical Results 
 
 The exogenous identifying variables in the nursing home entry and daily visit equations 
are the parent’s health and wealth as well as how close the adult child lives to the parent.6  We 
assume the characteristics of the parents do not have a direct effect on the adult child’s labor 
supply but rather affect the adult child’s labor supply through the decision to provide assistance 
or the parent’s decision to enter a nursing home.  In the labor supply equation we condition out 
the wage with Z, a vector of determinants of labor market earning power (age, education, marital 
status and fertility history), which facilitates including labor market non-participants by not 
having to predict their potential wage.  In addition to contributing to identification, the effect of 
the adult child’s lagged nonwage income on labor supplied enters into equations (4) and (5), 
which imply the adult child’s welfare losses. 
 By way of overview, Tables 4 and 5 present labor supply results for daughters where the 
parent’s nursing home entry and the adult child’s visits to the parent are first treated as 
exogenous for comparison with the focal model where they are permitted to be endogenous 
econometrically.  Tables 4 and 5 also clarify whether allowing for alternatives to joint normality 
of errors matters to the estimates.7 
 Comparative econometric results for sons reveal no noticeable economic connections 
among the son’s labor supply, how much the son visits the parent, and whether the parent is in a 
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nursing home.8  Our results conform to the popular belief that daughters bear more of the burden 
of caring for elderly sick parents and are not inconsistent with prior research that has shown 
women provide more intensive informal care assistance to elderly parents (Stoller 1990).  For 
example, among persons who in the Health and Retirement Study report spending at least 200 
hours helping their parents, the mean time transfers to parents over a 24-month period was 1,008 
hours for women and 547 hours for men (Johnson and Lo Sasso 2000).  Because of the lack of a 
connection between adult sons’ labor supply and parents’ health that we find in what follows we 
discuss only the equation estimates and associated welfare implications for adult daughters. 
Parametric Full-Information Results 
 Because the coefficients of interest are substantially different in both size and statistical 
significance, a comparison of the results in Tables 4 and 5 indicates rejection of exogeneity of 
daily visits to the parent and exogeneity of a parent’s nursing home entry.  When possible 
endogeneity is ignored daily parental visits and whether a parent is in a nursing home have no 
estimated effects on the adult daughter’s labor supplied, and when visits and nursing home are 
allowed to be endogenous within the context of a full-information empirical framework based on 
joint normality then a significantly positive (income) effect of nursing home entry and a 
significantly negative (time) effect of daily visits appear.9  Because the results more strongly 
suggest endogeneity than not, when discussing the econometric results presented in Table 5. 
 To facilitate understanding of the labor supply implications we present the marginal 
effect estimates from the FIML model in the second column of Table 5.  Compared to a daughter 
who visits her parent less frequently, a daughter who visits her parent daily works about 75 
percent less, or 858 fewer hours, annually.  An adult daughter whose parent enters a nursing 
home works about 63 percent more, or 713 additional hours, annually.10  The FIML estimates in 
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Table 5 indicate that the 8 percent of daughters who visit a parent in a nursing home daily will 
each work about 145 hours or 13 percent less annually. 
 For the normality-based model we can also separate the overall marginal labor supply 
effects of daily visits to and nursing home entry by a frail elderly parent into the two underlying 
conditional marginal labor supply effects.  Compared to daughters who visit their parents less 
frequently, working daughters who visit daily work 32 percent fewer hours and have 
approximately double the likelihood of being a labor force non-participant.  The conditional 
positive labor supply effect of having a parent enter a nursing home is 26 percent greater work 
hours among working women and a 100 percent lower rate of labor force non-participation.  For 
working women the dual time and income effects of having a frail elderly parent are slightly 
fewer (5 percent less) annual hours of work. 
Semi-Parametric Limited Information Results  
Unlike OLS if the errors are non-normal in a nonlinear censored regression model based 
on normality of errors then parameter estimates are inconsistent (Greene 2000: 916).  One 
recently suggested approach to limited-dependent variables systems such as ours begins by 
noting that, although possibly leading to predicted values that lie outside the theoretically limited 
ranges of the unit interval or strictly non-negative, two-stage least squares will at least avoid the 
bias of fitting the wrong stochastic structure (Angrist 2001).  Because it is a limited information 
technique 2SLS will also avoid spreading any specification errors from the two structural 
equations for the parent’s entry into a nursing home entry and the daughter’s daily visits to the 
parent to the estimated daughter’s labor supply function.  The third column of Table 5 presents 
the possibly more robust 2SLS labor supply estimates applying the linear reduced form equations 
for visits and nursing home entry in Appendix B, Table B.1.  A comparison of the 2SLS results 
in Table 5 with the analogous OLS results in Table 4 again suggests that exogeneity of daily 
 
15 
visits is incorrect empirically.  Compared to the FIML results the less tightly parameterized 
2SLS results have an overall estimated effect of daily visits to the parent on the daughter’s labor 
supply that is 15 percent smaller and an overall estimated effect of nursing home entry that is 
about 50 percent smaller and statistically insignificant. 
 As noted, a more statistically elegant and theoretically proper way to obviate possible 
parameter inconsistency due to an empirically incorrect assumption of normal errors is to 
estimate the daughter’s labor supply with an instrumental variables censored least absolute 
deviations regression (Powell 1984; Newey 1985; Blundell and Powell 2000).  Also a limited 
information technique, our IV-CLAD estimator first produces reduced-form fitted values for the 
binary potentially endogenous outcomes of nursing home entry and daily visits using the 
distribution-free maximum score (MSCORE) estimator described earlier (Manski 1985, 1986). 
The instrumented values from the MSCORE results displayed in Appendix B, Table B.1 then 
appear as right-hand side regressors in the CLAD regression whose coefficients and bootstrapped 
standard errors appear in the last column of Table 5.  For comparison purposes a CLAD 
regression that assumes complete right-hand side exogeneity appears in the last column of 
Table 4. 
 The pair of CLAD regression results in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the other 
results from FIML and 2SLS in the sense of rejecting exogeneity of daily visits and nursing 
home entry.  The IV-CLAD results are more similar to 2SLS than FIML in that nursing home 
entry has an insignificant coefficient.  However, when estimated by IV-CLAD the effect of daily 
visits is the largest of the three estimators.  According to Table 5, a daughter who visits her frail 
elderly parent daily works, on average, 1,092 hours less per year than a daughter who visits her 
parent less frequently than daily.  The 60 percent lower labor supply is due largely to reduced 
labor force participation among daughters who need to visit their frail elderly parents daily.11 
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Crude calculations are that the reduced work hours of daughters who visit their parents daily go 
one-for-one into additional contact with their frail elderly parents.12 
Welfare and Policy Implications 
 Because of their desirable econometric properties of satisfying the concept of a censored 
regression that is purged of any statistical inconsistency due to an incorrectly specified error 
distribution when discussing the economic implications of our labor supply results we focus on 
the IV-CLAD results.  The robust IV-CLAD estimates indicate that of the two parental variables 
that are potentially endogenous influences on the daughter’s labor supplied it is not where the 
parent lives but rather whether the daughter visits daily that matters to her work behavior. 
 Applying the Rothbarth welfare calculation in (5) using our IV-CLAD estimates of 
Table 5 yields the result that a daughter with a parent in such poor health that she finds it 
necessary to visit her frail elderly parent daily suffers a welfare loss in current dollars of 
approximately $180,000, which is significant at the 0.11 level using a one-tail test.13  There is a 
substantial estimated economic burden on the daughter of a parent whose health declines as 
revealed by her change in labor supply in contrast to a son. 
 Because they apply to a population largely without long-term care insurance our results 
are informative concerning the current policy debate involving the elderly and their adult 
children.  One result of interest is that children do not appear to visit frail elderly parents any 
more (or less) when the parent enters a nursing home for an extended stay (see Appendix A, 
Table A.4 and Appendix B, Table B.2).  The optimality of publicly provided long-term care 
insurance has been hotly debated.  A concern with governmentally provided long-term health 
insurance is that the elderly may not want it because they prefer care by a loved one (Pauly 1990; 
Zweifel and Strüwe 1998).  Because the degree of care adult daughters personally provide for 
their parents seems largely to depend on how close the parents live (see Appendix B, Tables B.1 
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and B.2), and residential proximity to parent is also largely exogenous to parental health, there 
should be no reluctance to want long-term care insurance on the grounds that nursing home care 
crowds out higher-quality care by ones own adult children.  
 The other policy issue of current interest to which our results speak is the consequences 
of a tax credit for helping with the long-term care of an elderly person.  Recent proposals to 
provide children who devote time or financial resources to the care of an aged parent with a tax 
credit of $5,000 have been accompanied by two extreme opinions (Pear 1999).  The proponents 
of the credit contend that it is reasonably generous while the potential recipients of the credit 
express dismay at how little they believe it to be. 
 The confusion and debate over how generous is the proposed tax credit for sons and 
daughters who care for sick aged parents stems from confusion over the program’s goal: is it to 
obviate the direct financial consequence of an adult child’s decision to withdraw from the labor 
force to help care for a sick parent or is it to cancel most of the overall burden to the adult child 
of having a parent’s health decline greatly?  Our results can help reconcile the two positions 
because they are consistent with both.  In particular, we find that the credit proposed is about 60 
percent of the earnings loss daughters exhibit when they must visit their parent daily.  In the 
limited sense of making the immediate opportunity cost financially less burdensome the 
proposed credit is reasonably generous.  Alternatively, our estimated welfare loss to the daughter 
of a parent in need of daily visits is 36 times that of the credit.  The greater implicit loss (over 
and above the opportunity cost of lost earnings) may come from the stress of having to interact 
so much with a parent whose health is extremely poor.  In the sense of inoculating adult children 
against the overall losses from an elderly parent falling seriously ill the tax credit is far less 
generous than other programs to offset the welfare loss from an economic event such as 
unemployment.  
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6. Conclusion 
 
 We find economically significant labor supply responses by adult daughters to poor 
parental health necessitating frequent visits.  The economic implications are varied.  It provides 
evidence of meaningful intergenerational connections to the labor market.  Our results also point 
to the need to consider help from the children when designing and considering a plan to provide 
governmentally subsidized long-term care insurance.  The behavior we study reveals a major 
welfare loss on adult daughters from poor parental health, which helps to clarify the positions in 
the debate over recent proposals for a tax credit for a person who helps to care for a sick aged 
parent.  In the limited sense of making the immediate opportunity cost financially less 
burdensome the proposed credit is reasonably generous.  In the sense of insuring the children 
against the overall loss from an elderly parent falling seriously ill the typical tax credit is far less 
generous than existing programs. 
More generally, the rise in married women’s labor force participation rates threatens to 
weaken the family’s role as primary care giver to the elderly.  Although men in our data set 
appear no less likely than women to provide care for their elderly parents, women are much more 
likely to experience economically costly consequences of assisting their parents.  Thus, women’s 
increased work responsibilities may be incompatible with their traditional care giving 
responsibilities.  Other demographic trends could apply additional pressure on families.  For 
instance, declining mortality rates have increased the number of elderly in the population in 
recent years.  Moreover, despite falling rates of disability among the aged over the past 15 years 
(Manton, Corder, and Stallard 1993, 1997), the total number of persons in need of personal care 
assistance continues to rise.  At the same time, declining rates of fertility have reduced the 
number of children that will be available to provide care to their parents in the future.  
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How families balance caregiving responsibilities for elderly parents with paid 
employment will have important implications for retirement and long-term care policies.  As 
baby boom women enter midlife and their parents develop disabilities, questions about the 
availability of long-term care for the frail elderly will become increasingly urgent, particularly if 
the rise in the labor force participation rate of married women results in a smaller share of 
women able to provide informal care to their elderly parents in coming years.  Fewer adult 
children available to provide informal care could increase the number of older persons who turn 
to formal care, such as home health services and nursing home care, which could in turn increase 
the rate of growth of home care expenditures under Medicare and nursing home expenditures 
under Medicaid (Buchanan et al. 1991).  
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Appendix Table A.1.    Men’s Labor Supply Under Exogeneitya 
 
Tobit 
 OLS Coefficient Marginal Effectb CLAD 
Daily visits −0.0343 
(0.1255) 
−0.0477 
(0.1312) 
−0.0471 0.0738 
(0.0729) 
Nursing home entry 0.0052 
(0.1160) 
0.0109 
(0.1209) 
0.0108 0.0463 
(0.0674) 
Non-wage income −0.4571 
(0.3263) 
−0.4909 
(0.3404) 
−0.4845 0.0811 
(0.1466) 
Children age 1–2 −0.0362 
(0.1840) 
−0.0424 
(0.1914) 
−0.0418 −0.1481 
(0.1069) 
Children age 3–5 0.1288 
(0.1596) 
0.1380 
(0.1659) 
0.1362 −0.0127 
(0.0925) 
Children age 6–13 0.0544 
(0.0722) 
0.0513 
(0.0751) 
0.0506 −0.0170 
(0.0417) 
Children age 14–17 0.0952 
(0.1115) 
0.1158 
(0.1160) 
0.1143 −0.0152 
(0.0630) 
Age −1.8847*** 
(0.6795) 
−2.0403*** 
(0.7082) 
−2.0135 −1.0346*** 
(0.3765) 
Education 0.8370*** 
(0.3200) 
0.9019*** 
(0.3339) 
0.8901 0.4030** 
(0.1832) 
Married 0.0772 
(0.2084) 
0.0856 
(0.2176) 
0.0845 0.0720 
(0.1176) 
Years work experience 0.9710** 
(0.4186) 
1.0199** 
(0.4358) 
1.0065 0.3670 
(0.2318) 
Time trend 0.0598 
(0.7567) 
0.1108 
(0.7884) 
0.1093 −0.0348 
(0.4235) 
Time squared 0.0959 
(0.6030) 
0.0309 
(0.6287) 
0.0305 0.2195 
(0.3419) 
Non-white −0.1219 
(0.1398) 
−0.1208 
(0.1458) 
−0.1192 −0.1090 
(0.0792) 
Constant 2.2960*** 
(0.5382) 
2.3269*** 
(0.5605) 
— 2.3138*** 
(0.2979) 
     aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size 269. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, non-wage income 
scaled by 50,000, age scaled by 60, education scaled by 10, experience scaled by 42, time and time squared 
scaled by 10. 
     bTo derive McDonald-Moffitt decomposition, multiply coefficient by 0.9107 to get change in hours 
conditional on positive hours, and by 0.0762 to get change in the probability of zero hours. 
*  0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10  **  0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05  ***   p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A.2.    Men’s Labor Supply Under Endogeneitya 
 
FIMLc 
 2SLSb Coefficient Marginal Effectd IV-CLADb,e 
Daily visits 0.0600 
(0.2035) 
0.1183 
(0.2572) 
0.1164 0.6654 
(0.6946) 
Nursing home entry −0.0775 
(0.2229) 
−0.4276 
(0.2832) 
−0.4209 0.2743 
(0.4376) 
Non-wage income −0.4862 
(0.3308) 
−0.5927* 
(0.3087) 
−0.5834 0.0935 
(0.7414) 
Children age 1–2 −0.0335 
(0.1846) 
−0.0552 
(0.2905) 
−0.0543 −0.0892 
(0.1215) 
Children age 3–5 0.1433 
(0.1626) 
0.1818 
 (0.2561) 
0.1789 0.0427 
(0.1033) 
Children age 6–13 0.0490 
(0.0735) 
0.0541 
 (0.1082) 
0.0532 0.0249 
(0.0665) 
Children age 14–17 0.1025 
(0.1124) 
0.1211 
(0.1593) 
0.1192 −0.0093 
(0.1102) 
Age −1.8264*** 
(0.6901) 
−1.9034* 
(1.0634) 
−1.8735 −1.3872** 
(0.6635) 
Education 0.9088*** 
(0.3372) 
1.0789** 
 (0.4795) 
1.0619 0.4980* 
(0.2590) 
Married 0.0789 
(0.2089) 
0.1336 
 (0.2386) 
0.1315 0.0009 
(0.1587) 
Years work 
experience 
0.9685** 
(0.4198) 
1.0642* 
 (0.5514) 
1.0475 0.5996 
(0.4387) 
Time trend 0.0261 
(0.7616) 
0.0881 
 (0.9789) 
0.0867 −0.3741 
(0.6794) 
Time squared 0.1319 
(0.6080) 
0.0809 
 (0.8090) 
0.0796 0.5239 
(0.6010) 
Non-white −0.1367 
(0.1423) 
−0.1867 
(0.1965) 
−0.1838 −0.1599 
(0.1028) 
Constant 2.2215*** 
(0.5500) 
2.1524** 
 (0.8610) 
— 2.1316*** 
(0.4806) 
     aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size is 269. Dependent variable is scaled by 1000, non-wage 
income scaled by 50,000, age scaled by 60, education scaled by 10, experience scaled by 42, time and time 
squared scaled by 10. 
     bFirst stage regression results displayed in Appendix Table A.3.  
     cOther FIML coefficient estimates displayed in Appendix Table A.4.  
     dTo derive McDonald-Moffitt decomposition, multiply coefficient by 0.8979 to get change in hours 
conditional on positive hours, and by 0.0864 to get change in the probability of zero hours. 
     eStandard errors based on 20 bootstrap iterations. 
*  0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10  **  0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05  ***   p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A.3.    Men’s First Stage OLS and M-Score 
Regressions for Nursing Home Entry and Daily Visitsa 
 
Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
 OLS M-Scoreb OLS M-Scoreb 
Time trend 0.0214 — 0.2505 — 
 (0.3789)  (0.3225)  
     Time squared −0.0609 — −0.1948 — 
 (0.3044)  (0.2591)  
     Nonwhite −0.0561 — 0.0455 — 
 (0.0721)  (0.0614)  
     Net worth −0.2088* −0.0900 0.2373*** 0.2712 
 (0.1069) (0.2096) (0.0910) (0.2921) 
     ADLs  −0.1036 — 0.0227 −0.1382 
 (0.1145)  (0.0974) (0.2083) 
     IADLs  0.4289*** 0.3753 0.0396 0.3051 
 (0.1518) (0.2471) (0.1292) (0.3195) 
     Chronic conditions −0.1276 — 0.2666** 0.3056 
 (0.1233)  (0.1050) (0.2622) 
     Spouse present −0.0849 −0.2441 −0.0107 — 
 (0.0609) (0.1621) (0.0519)  
     Own home −0.0820 −0.2026 0.0234 — 
 (0.0601) (0.1436) (0.0512)  
     Parents < 1 mile  0.0831 — 0.7156*** 0.5135*** 
 (0.0808)  (0.0687) (0.1425) 
     Parents 1–10 miles 0.0569 — 0.2984*** 0.1391 
 (0.0631)  (0.0537) (0.1561) 
     # Sons −0.3658** −0.2438 0.1247 — 
 (0.1660) (0.2551) (0.1413)  
     # Daughters 0.1200 — −0.1624 0.0554 
 (0.2083)  (0.1773) (0.1747) 
     Age 0.2980* — −0.2954 — 
 (0.1751)  (0.4637)  
     Education  −0.0951 0.2971 0.1047 — 
 (0.0607) (0.2934) (0.1490)  
     Mom frail 0.4032 −0.0877 −0.0433 0.0999 
 (0.5448) (0.1627) (0.0517) (0.1413) 
     Hospitalized 0.2126*** 0.2859* −0.0035 — 
 (0.0532) (0.1672) (0.0453)  
     Hip 0.1211 0.1800 −0.0110 — 
 (0.0738) (0.2254) (0.0628)  
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Appendix Table A.3.    Continued 
 
Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
 OLS M-Score1 OLS M-Score1 
Stroke 0.1308 0.0987 −0.0241 −0.2696 
 (0.1311) (0.2633) (0.1116) (0.2526) 
     Stroke∗ADL 0.2255 — −0.3045 0.2968 
 (0.2246)  (0.1912) (0.3798) 
     Stroke∗IADL −0.0544 — 0.2748 −0.0990 
 (0.3037)  (0.2585) (0.2727) 
     Incontinence 0.0946 0.0888 −0.0141 — 
 (0.0621) (0.1493) (0.0528)  
     Beds/1000 pop 0.1711 — −0.2064 −0.2167 
 (0.1583)  (0.1348) (0.2384) 
     Medicaid rate −0.2969 −0.5812 0.1167 — 
 (0.2807) (0.5783) (0.2390)  
     Adult Child Characteristics    
Non-wage income −0.1030 — 0.0341 — 
 (0.1613)  (0.1373)  
     Children age 1–2 0.0606 — 0.0462 — 
 (0.0912)  (0.0777)  
     Children age 3–5 0.0648 — −0.0450 0.0062 
 (0.0794)  (0.0676) (0.1319) 
     Children age 6–13 −0.0490 −0.1977 −0.0015 — 
 (0.0354) (0.1409) (0.0301)  
     Children age 14–17 0.0379 — 0.0076 — 
 (0.0546)  (0.0465)  
     Age 0.4294 0.1981 0.2106 — 
 (0.3698) (0.3580) (0.3148)  
     Education 0.2011 — −0.2874** −0.2881 
 (0.1694)  (0.1442) (0.2783) 
     Married −0.0395 — 0.0251 — 
 (0.1034)  (0.0880)  
     Years work  −0.0126 — −0.1437 — 
 Experience (0.2101)  (0.1788)  
     Constant −0.5903 −0.2172 0.1745 −0.3523* 
 (0.4317) (0.2465) (0.3675) (0.1869) 
     aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size 269. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, net worth scaled by 
500,000, ADLs, IADLs, chronic conditions, education, number of sons and daughters scaled by 10, parent’s age 
scaled by 97, beds scaled by 81.40, Medicaid rate scaled by 94.15, non-wage income scaled by 50,000, age scaled 
by 60, education scaled by 10, experience scaled by 42, time and time squared scaled by 10. 
     bStandard errors based on 20 bootstrap iterations. 
*  0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10  **  0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05  ***   p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table A.4.    Additional Coefficient Estimates from 
Men’s FIML Regressionsa 
 
 Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
Nursing home entry — −0.2266 
  (0.9852) 
   Non-white −0.1985 0.1806 
 (0.3151) (0.5312) 
   Net worth −0.8041 0.9168* 
 (0.6537) (0.5037) 
   ADLs  −0.2462 −0.2694 
 (0.5238) (0.6735) 
   IADLs  1.7966** 0.4605 
 (0.7215) (0.9594) 
   Chronic conditions −0.3519 1.0976 
 (0.5769) (0.6693) 
   Hospitalized 0.5654** — 
 (0.2524)  
   Hip 0.3378 — 
 (0.2863)  
   Stroke 0.8530 — 
 (0.7417)  
   Stroke∗ADL 0.3002 — 
 (1.0352)  
   Stroke∗IADL −0.1914 — 
 (1.5950)  
   Incontinence 0.3058 — 
 (0.2548)  
   Age 4.1063** — 
 (2.0739)  
   Age 75–80 — −0.4753 
  (0.4244) 
   Age 80–85 — −0.1487 
  (0.4506) 
   Age 85+ — 0.0187 
  (0.6233) 
   Education 1.3538** — 
 (0.6803)  
   Mom frail −0.3246 — 
 (0.2978)  
   Spouse present −0.2885 0.0637 
 (0.2671) (0.3353) 
   Parent < 1 mile away — 2.5179*** 
  (0.3922) 
   Parent 1–10 miles away — 1.3941*** 
  (0.3575) 
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Appendix Table A.4.    Continued 
 Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
Own home −0.3969 0.1718 
 (0.2512) (0.3905) 
   Number of sons −1.9250** 0.1265 
 (0.8480) (1.2650) 
   Number of daughters 0.3236 −0.9458 
 (0.8989) (1.3136) 
   Beds/1000 population 0.3306 — 
 (0.6747)  
   Medicaid Rate −1.2114 — 
 (1.0180)  
   Time trend 0.1520 1.9100 
 (1.6889) (2.8088) 
   Time squared −0.2734 −1.4613 
 (1.3670) (2.0876) 
   Adult Child Characteristics   
Non-wage income — 0.0018 
  (0.0299) 
   Children age 1–2 — 0.1848 
  (0.6844) 
   Children age 3–5 — −0.2891 
  (0.6023) 
   Children age 6–13 — −0.0495 
  (0.2357) 
   Children age 14–17 — 0.0096 
  (0.3200) 
   Age — 0.0712 
  (1.7800) 
   Education — −1.4617 
  (1.1601) 
   Married — 0.1303 
  (0.4203) 
   Years work experience — −0.3269 
  (0.9906) 
   Constant −4.4285** −2.0065 
 (1.8376) 
 
(1.8241) 
Sigma1 0.9056***   (0.0490) 
Sigma12 0.3626   (0.4369) 
Sigma13 −0.8301   (0.5031) 
Sigma23 0.1663   (1.2792) 
     aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size 269. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, net 
worth scaled by 500,000, ADLs, IADLs, chronic conditions, education, number of sons and 
daughters scaled by 10, parent’s age scaled by 97, beds scaled by 81.40, Medicaid rate scaled 
by 94.15, non-wage income scaled by 50,000, age scaled by 60, education scaled by 10, 
experience scaled by 42, time and time squared scaled by 10. 
*  0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10 **  0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05 ***   p < 0.01 
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Appendix B 
 
Additional Regressions for Women 
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Appendix Table B.1.    Women’s First Stage OLS and M-Score Regressions 
for Nursing Home Entry and Daily Visitsa 
 
Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits  
 OLS M-Score OLS M-Score 
Time trend −0.2207 — −0.0078 — 
 (0.3393)  (0.3500)  
     Time squared 0.0585 — −0.0483 — 
 (0.2794)  (0.2882)  
     Non-white −0.1574** −0.5069 0.0983 −0.1391 
 (0.0639) (0.3263) (0.0659) (0.2897) 
     Net worth 0.0513 — 0.0525 — 
 (0.0787)  (0.0812)  
     ADLs  0.0536 — 0.0210 — 
 (0.1122)  (0.1158)  
     IADLs  0.1717 −0.0658 0.0641 — 
 (0.1393) (0.2170) (0.1436)  
     Chronic conditions −0.2815*** −0.0767 −0.0438 — 
 (0.0999) (0.2444) (0.1030)  
     Education 0.4206*** 0.1499 0.0667 — 
 (0.1609) (0.2120) (0.1660)  
     Mom frail −0.0353 — 0.0701 −0.0131 
 (0.0571)  (0.0589) (0.1570) 
     Age 1.4682*** 0.0596 0.1240 — 
 (0.4533) (0.2472) (0.4676)  
     Hospitalized 0.0823* 0.3825 −0.0292 — 
 (0.0486) (0.3592) (0.0502)  
     Spouse present −0.0770 −0.2386 −0.0331 — 
 (0.0574) (0.1984) (0.0592)  
     Own home −0.1560*** −0.3281 0.0858 −0.0885 
 (0.0542) (0.2316) (0.0559) (0.1868) 
     Parents < 1 mile 0.0911 0.2522 0.5574*** 0.7029** 
 (0.0726) (0.3700) (0.0749) (0.3363) 
     Parents 1–10 miles 0.1110* −0.0139 0.2237*** −0.1467 
 (0.0574) (0.2041) (0.0592) (0.2658) 
     Hip 0.0432 — −0.0435 — 
 (0.0760)  (0.0784)  
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Appendix Table B.1.    Continued 
Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
 OLS M-Scoreb OLS M-Scoreb 
Stroke 0.2126 −0.2028 0.0126 — 
 (0.1557) (0.3430) (0.1606)  
     Stroke∗ADL 0.4187** 0.0028 0.0424 — 
 (0.1918) (0.3029) (0.1979)  
     Stroke∗IADL −0.6791** −0.0205 −0.0675 — 
 (0.3079) (0.2019) (0.3176)  
     Incontinence 0.0409 — −0.0768 −0.0323 
 (0.0567)  (0.0585) (0.1519) 
     # Sons 0.0453 — −0.1776 0.1445 
 (0.1622)  (0.1673) (0.2832) 
     # Daughters −0.0705 — 0.2654* 0.2953 
 (0.1517)  (0.1565) (0.2569) 
     Beds/1000 pop 0.6663*** 0.4394 −0.1811 0.0521 
 (0.1556) (0.4340) (0.1605) (0.3290) 
     Medicaid rate 0.1353 — −0.3888 −0.1302 
 (0.2745)  (0.2832) (0.2703) 
     Adult Child Characteristics    
Non-wage income 0.0424 — −0.1587 — 
 (0.1589)  (0.1639)  
     Children age 1–2 −0.0108 — 0.0509 0.2505 
 (0.0756)  (0.0780) (0.2379) 
     Children age 3–5 −0.0048 — 0.0004 — 
 (0.0590)  (0.0609)  
     Children age 6–13 −0.0368 — −0.0024 — 
 (0.0347)  (0.0358)  
     Children age 14–17 0.0278 — 0.0087 — 
 (0.0437)  (0.0451)  
     Age −0.0191 — −0.2294 −0.2441 
 (0.2463)  (0.2540) (0.2187) 
     Education −0.0613 — −0.0795 −0.1769 
 (0.1554)  (0.1603) (0.2750) 
     Married 0.0070 — 0.0394 0.2173 
 (0.0600)  (0.0619) (0.2749) 
     −0.1941 — −0.0749 — Years work experience 
(0.1270)  (0.1310)  
     Constant −1.1081*** −0.3122 0.3554 −0.3570 
 (0.3644) (0.2331) (0.3759) (0.2376) 
     aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size 293. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, net 
worth scaled by 500,000, ADLs, IADLs, chronic conditions, education, number of sons and 
daughters scaled by 10, parent’s age scaled by 97, beds scaled by 81.40, Medicaid rate scaled by 
94.15, non-wage income scaled by 50,000, age scaled by 60, education scaled by 10, experience 
scaled by 42, time and time squared scaled by 10. 
     bStandard errors based on 20 bootstrap iterations. 
*  0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10  **  0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05  ***   p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table B.2.    Additional Coefficient Estimates From 
Women’s FIML Regressions 
 
 Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
Nursing home entry — 0.0656 
  (0.5964) 
   Non-white −0.8326** 0.2906 
 (0.3558) (0.2996) 
   Net worth 0.1766 0.1642 
 (0.6090) (0.3732) 
   ADLs  −0.0855 0.0660 
 (0.6107) (0.4400) 
   IADLs  1.0178 0.2234 
 (0.8014) (0.5449) 
   Chronic conditions −0.8858** −0.4679 
 (0.4321) (0.5142) 
   Hospitalized 0.4457* — 
 (0.2532)  
   Hip 0.2363 — 
 (0.3109)  
   Stroke 1.2774** — 
 (0.6419)  
   Stroke∗ADL 1.8629** — 
 (0.9268)  
   Stroke∗IADL −3.4937** — 
 (1.3541)  
   Incontinence 0.2382 — 
 (0.2507)  
   Age 5.5063*** — 
 (2.0023)  
   Aged 75 to 80 — 0.1257 
  (0.2857) 
   Aged 80 to 85 — −0.1182 
  (0.3283) 
   Aged 85+ — −0.0505 
  (0.4208) 
   Education 1.6334** — 
 (0.8208)  
   Mom frail −0.0254 — 
 (0.2540)  
   Spouse present −0.2340 −0.2568 
 (0.2786) (0.2518) 
   Parent < 1 mile away — 1.8557*** 
  (0.3417) 
   Parent 1–10 miles away — 0.9301*** 
  (0.2548) 
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Appendix Table B.2.    Continued 
 Nursing Home Entry Daily Visits 
Own home −0.6335** 0.5017* 
 (0.2484) (0.2883) 
   Number of sons 0.3235 −0.3268 
 (0.8743) (0.7262) 
   Number of daughters −0.3030 1.0463* 
 (0.8912) (0.6303) 
   Beds/1000 population 2.6805*** — 
 (0.7508)  
   Medicaid Rate 0.3154 — 
 (1.6600)  
   Time trend −0.5266 −0.0041 
 (1.3165) (0.0043) 
   Time squared −0.0806 −0.2037 
 (1.1514) (1.2731) 
   Adult Child Characteristics   
Non-wage income — −2.2469 
  (6.0727) 
   Children aged 1 to 2 — 0.2103 
  (0.2842) 
   Children aged 3 to 5 — 0.0670 
  (0.2680) 
   Children aged 6 to 13 — −0.0298 
  (0.1863) 
   Children aged 14 to 17 — 0.0682 
  (0.2273) 
   Age — −0.4033 
  (1.0900) 
   Education — −0.0158 
  (0.7900) 
   Married — 0.0920 
  (0.2788) 
   Years work experience — −0.1679 
  (0.5597) 
   Constant −6.5746*** −1.3095 
 (1.8520) (1.2125) 
sigma1 1.1787***    (0.1060) 
sigma12 0.5893***    (0.1895) 
sigma13 −0.4746**    (0.2260) 
sigma23 −0.0167    (0.4175) 
     aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size 293. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, 
net worth scaled by 500,000, ADLs, IADLs, chronic conditions, education, number of 
sons and daughters scaled by 10, parent’s age scaled by 97, beds scaled by 81.40, 
Medicaid rate scaled by 94.15, non-wage income scaled by 50,000, age scaled by 60, 
education scaled by 10, experience scaled by 42, time and time squared scaled by 10. 
*  0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10 **  0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05 ***   p < 0.01 
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1. We are implicitly assuming that the child’s marginal rate of substitution between leisure 
and consumption is independent of parental health.  
 
2. A maximum likelihood approach depends critically on the correctness of the assumed 
error term distribution. Even modest deviation from the typical parametric stochastic 
assumptions can lead to serious biases in coefficient estimates (Arabmazar and Schmidt 
1982; Paarsch 1984; Moon 1989; Melenberg and Van Soest 1996). 
 
3. Alternatively, Newey (1985) suggests using Powell’s (1986) symmetrically trimmed least 
squares estimator, which depends on the more econometrically restrictive requirement of 
a symmetric error distribution.  
 
4. Activities of daily living are the number of the following activities that the frail elder 
needed help doing: eating, getting in or out of bed, getting in or out of chairs, dressing, 
walking around inside the house, going outside, bathing, and using the washroom. 
Instrumental activities of daily living are the number of the following activities that the 
frail elder needed help doing: preparing meals, doing laundry, light housework, shopping, 
managing money, taking medication, and making phone calls. 
 
5. It is possible that distance to parents is endogenous with respect to care giving and 
nursing home entry because adult children who are more likely to be care givers relocate 
or choose not to relocate to be closer to their parents.  Past research does not reject 
exogeneity of residential location with respect to nursing home entry or frequency of 
visits, so we do not complicate our model with an equation explaining adult sons’ and 
daughters’ location choices (Stern 1995). 
 
6. In earlier versions of the model we used an ordered probit to represent a finer distinction 
among levels of visits.  The results indicated no information loss by aggregating visits 
less frequent than daily into a single category. 
 
7. The estimated equations for nursing home and visits to parent are displayed in 
Appendix B. 
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8. For the reader’s interest the men’s results are tabulated in Appendix A. 
 
9. More formally, exogeneity is rejected using a Hausman type test that compares only the 
joint difference of the potentially endogenous variables between the Tobit and FIML 
estimates.  A full Hausman test examining the overall difference in coefficients does not 
reveal enough difference in coefficients between the Tobit and FIML labor supply 
models to reject exogeneity.  We interpret the two Hausman tests’ results as indicating 
economically significant but not statistically significant differences in models.  Because 
many coefficients are statistically insignificant the overall vectors of coefficients do not 
appear as statistically different even though the coefficients of interest, visits and nursing 
home, are statistically different when treated as exogenous versus endogenous.  For a 
discussion of economic versus statistical significance see McCloskey and Ziliak (1996). 
 
10. Our three-equation model is a triangular system of equations wherein nursing home entry 
affects daily care giving and both nursing home entry and daily care giving affect labor 
supply.  The statistically pyramidal structure is usual for simultaneous limited dependent 
variables models so that they do not violate ex ante the limits on jointly probabilistic 
outcomes.  The two dimensions of a frail parent’s health care needs are independent in 
the sense that there is no effect of the parent entering a nursing home on whether the 
daughter visits her parent daily versus less frequently (see Appendix B, Table B.2). 
 
11. Because parent information exists only in the year of frailty our data do not permit 
dynamic modeling.  However, we can compare the daughter’s labor supply in the year the 
parent became frail to her labor supply in the year before frailty.  The noticeable change 
before and after frailty for the women who visited their parent daily is a 5-percentage 
point reduction in the labor force participation rate rather than a change in hours worked 
by continuously working daughters.  The observed longitudinal decline in the individual 
women’s labor force attachment is additionally comforting because it supports the 
conclusions we draw from the cross-section regressions in Table 5. 
 
12. About 28 percent of daughters in our data visit their parent daily, 32 percent visit weekly, 
14 percent visit monthly, and 26 percent visit yearly or less frequently.  If we apply the 
averages that daily visits mean 300 days per year for four hours per day, then women 
who visit daily spend about 1,200 hours per year with their parent.  For the non-daily visit 
groups we apply the following estimates: 50 weekly visits at six hours per visit equals 
300 hours annually, 12 monthly visits at eight hours per visit equals 96 hours annually, 
and zero hours annually for daughters who visit annually or less frequently.  Applying the 
proportions in each category yields an average annual hours visiting parents among 
daughters who visit less frequently than daily of about 150.  The difference in hours spent 
visiting their frail elderly parents among women who visit daily versus less frequently is 
then approximately the difference in their annual hours of work. 
 
13. The ratio of the coefficient of daily visits or nursing home to the coefficient of non-wage 
income must be inflated by 1.75 x $50,000 to account for the scaling of non-wage income 
and the 75 percent inflation since the 1983 base year. 
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Table 1.    Summary Statistics for Endogenous Variables 
Parent Health Supplement – PSID Data 
 
Sons Daughters 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Work Hours, Year of Frailty     
Percentage zero 7.25 --- 29.93 --- 
Mean Non-Zero 1,131.54 693.38 1,622.51 675.65 
     
Frequency of Visits to Parents     
Daily 23.79 --- 28.67 --- 
     
Nursing Home Entry 31.60 --- 28.67 --- 
N 260 203 
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Table 2.    Elderly Parent Characteristics 
Parent Health Supplement Data 
 
Sons Daughters 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Health Status Variables     
Activities of daily living impairments 3.36 3.19 4.06 3.23 
Instrumental activities of daily living impairments 4.48 2.35 4.57 2.44 
Number of chronic health conditions 3.96 2.23 4.32 2.42 
Hospitalization coincident with frailty 0.496 --- 0.551 --- 
Hip-related ailment 0.168 --- 0.126 --- 
Incontinence 0.267 --- 0.269 --- 
Stroke 0.305 --- 0.320 --- 
Stroke * ADLs  1.35 2.69 1.54 2.87 
Stroke * IADLs  1.56 2.68 1.79 2.84 
     
Demographic Characteristics     
Female 0.576 --- 0.514 --- 
Educationa 3.30 1.72 3.08 1.59 
Age 78.38 6.29 77.79 6.77 
Non-white 0.191 --- 0.303 --- 
Spouse present 0.481 --- 0.481 --- 
Homeowner 0.622 --- 0.680 --- 
Net worth 99,302.06 136,868.51 70,160.20 158,253.04 
Number of sons 1.94 1.97 2.10 1.81 
Number of daughters 1.63 1.61 2.00 1.95 
Year of frailty 1,987.16 2.90 1,987.04 2.89 
     
Policy and State Characteristics     
State Medicaid nursing home real reimbursement 
rate 
48.50 15.51 46.49 13.92 
Nursing home beds per 1000 elderly state residents  53.59 15.67 52.31 14.47 
N 269 269 
       aEducation level index: 1 = grades k–5, 2 = grades 6–8, 3 = grades 9–11, 4 = high school degree, 5 = high 
school and nonacademic training, 6 = some college, 7 = bachelors degree, 8 = graduate training. 
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Table 3.    Adult Child Characteristics 
Parent Health Supplement Data 
 
Sons Daughters 
 Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Married 0.931 --- 0.707 --- 
Lagged non-wage incomea 2,421.77 8,228.68 1,863.11 7,818.72 
     
Children     
Aged 1 to 2 0.09 0.31 0.09 0.33 
Aged 3 to 5 0.14 0.37 0.13 0.43 
Aged 6 to 13 0.48 0.81 0.40 0.75 
Aged 14 to 17 0.22 0.48 0.30 0.57 
     
Age 46.82 8.46 45.61 8.59 
Educationb 5.34 1.80 4.76 1.71 
Years of full-time work experience 22.53 9.51 11.15 8.95 
     
Distance to Parents     
Less than 1 mile 0.141 --- 0.157 --- 
1 to 10 miles 0.264 --- 0.304 --- 
     
N 269 293 
     aRent, interest, and dividends. 
     bEducation level index: 1 = grades k–5, 2 = grades 6–8, 3 = grades 9–11, 4 = high school degree, 5 = high 
school and nonacademic training, 6 = some college, 7 = bachelors degree, 8 = graduate training. 
     c1 =  less than a mile, 2 = 1–10 miles, 3 = 11–100 miles, 4 = 100+ but same state, 5 = 100+ and different 
state. 
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Table 4.    Alternate Specifications for Women’s Labor 
Supply Under Exogeneitya 
 
Tobit 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect OLS CLAD 
Daily visits −0.2192 
(0.1494) 
 
−0.1777 −0.1454 
(0.1098) 
−0.0627 
(0.1986) 
Nursing home entry 0.2014 
(0.1471) 
 
0.1633 0.1607 
(0.1094) 
0.0774 
(0.1993) 
Non-wage income −0.4507 
(0.4638) 
 
−0.3654 −0.2061 
(0.3215) 
0.1668 
(0.5158) 
Children age 1–2 −0.3263 
(0.2093) 
 
−0.2645 −0.1885 
(0.1519) 
−0.0937 
(0.2675) 
Children age 3–5 −0.4165** 
(0.1675) 
 
−0.3377 −0.2711** 
(0.1190) 
−0.3631* 
(0.2130) 
Children age 6–13 −0.1719* 
(0.0915) 
 
−0.1394 −0.1496** 
(0.0694) 
−0.2372** 
(0.1071) 
Children age 14–17 0.0259 
(0.1153) 
 
0.0210 −0.0064 
(0.0868) 
0.0816 
(0.1490) 
Age −3.2461*** 
(0.5836) 
 
−2.6317 −2.2401*** 
(0.4130) 
−3.0649*** 
(0.8112) 
Education 0.7671* 
(0.3914) 
 
0.6219 0.4687 
(0.2894) 
0.6502 
(0.5353) 
Married −0.3089* 
(0.1581) 
 
−0.2504 −0.2365** 
(0.1197) 
−0.2240 
(0.2086) 
Years work experience 2.1225*** 
(0.3568) 
 
1.7208 1.5268*** 
(0.2592) 
2.2209*** 
(0.4906) 
Time trend 1.9566** 
(0.9457) 
 
1.5863 1.2428* 
(0.6705) 
1.7380 
(1.2964) 
Time squared −1.0600 
(0.7722) 
 
−0.8594 −0.6809 
(0.5578) 
−0.5957 
(1.0414) 
Non-white −0.1008 
(0.1600) 
 
−0.0817 −0.0234 
(0.1179) 
−0.1071 
(0.2172) 
Constant 2.1081*** 
(0.6059) 
 
— 2.0178*** 
(0.4332) 
1.9348** 
(0.8087) 
     aStandard errors are in parentheses. Sample size is 293. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, non-
wage income scaled by 50,000, age scaled by 60, education scaled by 10, experience scaled by 42, 
time and time squared scaled by 10.  
     * 0.05 < p ≤ 0.10  ** 0.01 < p ≤ 0.05  *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5.    Alternate Specifications for Women’s Labor 
Supply Under Endogeneitya 
 
FIMLb 
 Coefficient Marginal Effect 2SLSc IV-CLADc,d 
Daily visits −1.0502*** 
(0.3377) 
−0.8580 −0.7256*** 
(0.2429) 
−1.0921** 
(0.5406) 
Nursing home entry 0.8726*** 
(0.3244) 
0.7129 0.3423 
(0.2188) 
0.3291 
(0.5813) 
Non-wage income −0.6605 
(0.6173) 
−0.5396 −0.3387 
(0.3421) 
−0.5238 
(0.3602) 
Children age 1–2 −0.2749 
(0.2722) 
−0.2246 −0.1634 
(0.1602) 
0.0835 
(0.1976) 
Children age 3–5 −0.4239** 
(0.2088) 
−0.3463 −0.2756** 
(0.1254) 
−0.3918** 
(0.1739) 
Children age 6–13 −0.1899 
(0.1258) 
−0.1551 −0.1445** 
(0.0732) 
−0.2372* 
(0.1352) 
Children age 14–17 0.0297 
(0.1350) 
0.0243 −0.0227 
(0.0916) 
0.0905 
(0.1885) 
Age −3.6058*** 
(0.7623) 
−2.9458 −2.4015*** 
(0.4430) 
−2.7969*** 
(0.4516) 
Education 0.4868 
(0.4820) 
0.3977 0.3728 
(0.3074) 
0.4421 
(0.3684) 
Married −0.3461 
(0.2204) 
−0.2827 −0.2570** 
(0.1264) 
−0.1677 
(0.1213) 
Years work experience 1.9436*** 
(0.5035) 
1.5878 1.4751*** 
(0.2766) 
1.9630*** 
(0.3107) 
Time trend 2.1455** 
(1.0517) 
1.7528 1.3616* 
(0.7080) 
2.1545** 
(1.0522) 
Time squared −1.1800 
(0.9365) 
−0.9640 −0.8168 
(0.5894) 
−0.9996 
(0.9165) 
Non-white 0.1695 
(0.2173) 
0.1385 0.1115 
(0.1346) 
−0.0151 
(0.1608) 
Constant 2.5004*** 
(0.7420) 
— 2.2865*** 
(0.4721) 
2.0920*** 
(0.4402) 
       aStandard errors in parentheses. Sample size 293. Dependent variable scaled by 1000, non-wage income scaled by 
50,000, age scaled by 60, education scaled by 10, experience scaled by 42, time and time squared scaled by 10. 
     b Other FIML coefficient estimates displayed in Appendix Table A.4.  
     c First stage regression results displayed in Appendix Table A.3.  
     d Standard errors based on 20 bootstrap iterations. 
* 0.05 <  p ≤ 0.10  ** 0.01 <  p ≤ 0.05  *** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1.   Welfare Loss Calculation 
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